I. Introduction

Whistleblower programs have long been one of the federal government’s most effective tools for detecting and prosecuting corporate fraud. Programs administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) have collectively generated billions of dollars in enforcement recoveries and awarded hundreds of millions of dollars to individuals who came forward with original information about misconduct. Against this backdrop, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) launched its own initiative: the Criminal Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (“Pilot Program” or “the Program”).

Announced on August 1, 2024, and administered by the DOJ’s Criminal Division, the Pilot Program represents a landmark shift in how the federal government incentivizes private individuals to report corporate wrongdoing directly to the nation’s primary law enforcement agency. Unlike the SEC and CFTC programs, which are rooted in the securities and commodities regulatory frameworks, the DOJ’s program is grounded in the Department’s criminal enforcement authority and focuses on a distinct category of corporate misconduct. For the first time, individuals with credible knowledge of certain serious corporate crimes can turn to DOJ directly—and potentially receive a financial reward—without relying on an independent regulatory agency or the civil False Claims Act mechanism.

This overview is designed to give current and prospective clients a thorough understanding of how the Program works, who is eligible, what awards are available, and what practical steps a potential whistleblower should take before coming forward. Given the complexity of the legal landscape, anyone considering making a submission under this Program is strongly encouraged to consult with qualified legal counsel at the earliest opportunity.

II. Background and Purpose

The DOJ’s Pilot Program did not emerge from a vacuum. For years, federal prosecutors recognized that the existing constellation of whistleblower programs left meaningful gaps in coverage. The False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions allow private citizens to bring lawsuits on behalf of the government for fraud against federal programs, but those provisions apply narrowly to fraud involving government funds or contracts. The SEC and CFTC programs, while robust, are limited to securities and commodities violations. The IRS program applies only to federal tax fraud. As a result, a broad swath of serious corporate criminal activity—from money laundering at financial institutions to foreign bribery to healthcare fraud against private insurers—fell outside the reach of any financial reward mechanism that could encourage individuals to bring that information to law enforcement.

The DOJ’s response was to create a program that would fill precisely those gaps. By leveraging its existing forfeiture authority under federal law—specifically, provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizing the Attorney General to pay awards for information or assistance leading to a forfeiture—the Criminal Division designed a framework to offer financial incentives to individuals who provide original and truthful information about corporate crimes that fall within the Program’s covered categories.

The Program also reflects a broader strategic philosophy within the DOJ’s Criminal Division. For several years running, DOJ has emphasized the importance of voluntary self-disclosure by corporations and cooperation with government investigations as means of achieving reduced penalties. The Pilot Program is, in part, designed to “supercharge” enforcement by creating an independent channel through which corporate insiders can bring wrongdoing to DOJ’s attention, thereby increasing pressure on corporations to maintain effective internal compliance programs and to self-report misconduct before a whistleblower does so on their own.

It is also worth noting the timing of the Program’s evolution. Initially launched under the Biden administration in August 2024, the Program was updated by the Trump administration in May 2025, with the DOJ releasing revised guidance that expanded the Program’s covered categories to reflect updated enforcement priorities, as described in detail below.

III. Covered Areas of Corporate Misconduct

When the Pilot Program launched in August 2024, it was focused on four primary categories of corporate crime that were identified as areas in which existing whistleblower programs offered insufficient coverage:

Financial institution crimes. The Program covers certain crimes involving financial institutions, including money laundering and fraud perpetrated by or through banks, broker-dealers, and other regulated financial entities.

Foreign corruption. The Program covers violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and related statutes criminalizing bribery of foreign government officials by U.S. companies and individuals, as well as foreign nationals acting within the United States.

Domestic public corruption. The Program covers bribery and corruption of domestic government officials, including schemes involving public contracting, licensing, or other government decision-making processes.

Healthcare fraud against private payors. The Program covers healthcare fraud schemes that target private health insurers rather than federal programs like Medicare or Medicaid—areas that the False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions do not reach.

In May 2025, the DOJ significantly expanded the Program’s scope under updated guidance reflecting the enforcement priorities of the new administration. The following additional categories of corporate misconduct were added as covered areas:

Cartels and transnational criminal organizations. The Program now covers information about corporate entities that engage with, facilitate, or provide material benefit to drug cartels, human trafficking networks, or other transnational criminal organizations.

Federal immigration law violations. Consistent with the current administration’s enforcement priorities, the Program now covers corporate violations of federal immigration statutes, including the knowing employment of unauthorized workers at scale.

Material support of terrorism. Information revealing that a corporation has provided financial or logistical support to designated terrorist organizations now falls within the Program’s coverage.

Sanctions offenses. The Program covers violations of U.S. economic sanctions regimes administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), which have become an increasingly prominent area of DOJ enforcement.

Trade, tariff, and customs fraud. Given the administration’s heightened focus on trade enforcement, the Program now covers schemes to defraud U.S. Customs and Border Protection through misclassification of goods, undervaluation, or other import/export fraud.

Procurement fraud. Information about fraudulent schemes targeting federal procurement processes—where such fraud involves criminal conduct not already covered by the False Claims Act—may now be submitted under the Program.

This expansion meaningfully broadens the universe of potential whistleblowers and makes the Program relevant to a far wider range of industries, including logistics, manufacturing, financial services, and defense contracting.

IV. Eligibility Requirements

A. Who May Be Eligible

To be considered for an award under the Pilot Program, an individual must satisfy several core eligibility requirements. First and foremost, the whistleblower must be a natural person—corporations and other legal entities are categorically ineligible to receive awards under the Program.

The information submitted must be “original,” meaning it must be derived from the whistleblower’s independent knowledge or independent analysis, must be non-public in nature, and must not have been previously known to the DOJ. Information that merely restates or confirms what the government already knows will generally not qualify. The submission must also “materially add” to the information already in DOJ’s possession—a standard that requires the information to meaningfully advance the Department’s ability to investigate and prosecute the relevant misconduct.

Beyond originality, the information must be truthful and provided voluntarily. The submission must be complete—meaning the whistleblower is expected to disclose all information of which they are aware, including any personal involvement they may have had in the underlying conduct. Selective or partial disclosure to obtain an award while concealing unfavorable information would disqualify a submission and could expose the whistleblower to additional legal risk.

Finally, from a threshold perspective, the information must ultimately lead to a criminal or civil forfeiture exceeding $1 million in net proceeds. This requirement means that the Program is not designed for tips about minor corporate misconduct; rather, it is intended to generate intelligence about substantial corporate wrongdoing.

B. Who Is Ineligible

The Pilot Program contains several express disqualifications. An individual who meaningfully participated in the criminal conduct at issue—including anyone who orchestrated, led, executed, or knowingly profited from the criminal scheme—is not eligible for an award. Similarly, any person who has been convicted in connection with the conduct they are reporting is categorically excluded.

That said, the Program does recognize that some individuals involved in corporate misconduct may have played only a minimal role. A person whose participation was so limited that they could fairly be described as “plainly among the least culpable of those involved” is not automatically disqualified and may still be eligible for an award. This nuance is important: it means that individuals who were pressured into minor involvement in a scheme, or who participated in a peripheral capacity without awareness of the full scope of the misconduct, may still have viable paths to eligibility.

Other categories of ineligible persons include current DOJ officials, employees, and contractors, as well as individuals related to such persons at the time they obtained the original information. Foreign government officials who were elected or appointed at the time they acquired the information are also disqualified. And, as noted above, individuals who are eligible for an award under another U.S. government whistleblower program—such as the SEC or CFTC programs—for the same underlying scheme cannot “double-dip” by also claiming an award under this Program.

Individuals who make false or fraudulent statements to DOJ are likewise ineligible and may face separate criminal liability for doing so.

V. Award Structure and Amounts

Awards under the Pilot Program are calculated as a percentage of the net proceeds forfeited in connection with a successful prosecution, corporate criminal resolution, or civil forfeiture action to which the whistleblower’s information contributed. The award structure is tiered:

Up to 30% of the first $100 million in net forfeited proceeds;

Up to 5% of net forfeited proceeds between $100 million and $500 million; and

No award on net forfeited proceeds above $500 million.

It is critically important for potential whistleblowers to understand that all awards under the Program are entirely discretionary. Unlike the SEC and CFTC programs, which mandate a minimum award of 10% of qualifying sanctions exceeding $1 million, the DOJ program contains no guaranteed minimum. The Department retains full discretion as to whether to grant an award and, if so, in what amount.

In exercising this discretion, DOJ considers a range of factors bearing on the whistleblower’s contribution to the investigation and resolution, including: the degree to which the information was specific, credible, and timely; whether and to what extent the information significantly contributed to the resulting forfeiture; the significance of the misconduct reported; and the degree of the whistleblower’s cooperation with DOJ throughout the investigation. Factors that may reduce or eliminate an award include any culpability the whistleblower bears for the underlying misconduct, unreasonable delay in reporting, interference with internal compliance processes, and any prior monetary recovery by the whistleblower in connection with the same conduct.

The discretionary nature of the award mechanism distinguishes the DOJ program markedly from its regulatory counterparts and underscores the importance of presenting an original and compelling submission from the outset. A well-structured, thoroughly documented submission made with the assistance of experienced legal counsel is far more likely to result in a favorable award determination than an informal or incomplete report.

VI. How to Submit a Tip

Whistleblower submissions under the Pilot Program are made to DOJ’s Criminal Division through a dedicated submission portal accessible at www.justice.gov/CorporateWhistleblower. The portal became operational on August 1, 2024, the same date the Program launched. Submissions must be made in writing and must be signed under penalty of perjury.

Potential whistleblowers should be aware that the quality and completeness of the initial submission can be dispositive. The submission must clearly identify the nature of the alleged misconduct, the corporate entity or entities involved, the basis for the whistleblower’s personal knowledge or analysis, and the specific information being provided. Vague or conclusory allegations are unlikely to generate investigative interest and may not even be reviewed in depth by Department attorneys.

Given these considerations, we strongly advise potential whistleblowers not to submit directly without first consulting with a whistleblower attorney who can evaluate the strength and scope of the information, assess the applicable eligibility criteria, identify any personal legal exposure the whistleblower may face, structure the submission to maximize its persuasive impact, and advise on whether other whistleblower programs might provide a better avenue for the particular facts at hand.

VII. Anonymity and Confidentiality

One of the more practically significant aspects of the Pilot Program concerns the rules governing anonymous submissions. A whistleblower who does not have legal representation may not submit information anonymously under the Program. Anonymous submissions are only available to whistleblowers who submit through an attorney.

For those who wish to remain anonymous, the attorney must retain the original signed intake form—executed under penalty of perjury by the whistleblower—while the submission is pending with the Department. Both the whistleblower and their attorney must agree in advance to provide the whistleblower’s identity to DOJ if the Department determines that disclosure is necessary in the course of the investigation or any resulting prosecution. Before any award is paid, the whistleblower’s identity must be verified by the Department.

DOJ has publicly committed to protecting whistleblower confidentiality to the fullest extent permitted by law. The Department has also stated that it takes the issue of retaliation seriously and will consider any retaliatory conduct in its assessment of whether a corporation has truly cooperated with a government investigation or, conversely, has attempted to obstruct it. The government reserves the right to take appropriate enforcement action against employers who retaliate against whistleblowers, including by treating such retaliation as an aggravating factor in any resolution of the underlying investigation.

That said, potential whistleblowers should understand that the Program does not currently contain formal statutory anti-retaliation protections of the kind found in the Dodd-Frank Act, which governs the SEC and CFTC programs and which expressly prohibits employer retaliation against SEC and CFTC whistleblowers and provides a private right of action in federal court. The DOJ program’s approach to retaliation is currently enforcement-driven and discretionary rather than rights-based, which means that a whistleblower who suffers retaliation may have fewer guaranteed remedies than they would under the SEC regime. Whistleblowers facing retaliation concerns should evaluate all available legal theories, including potential protections under state law and other federal statutes such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

VIII. Relationship to Other Federal Whistleblower Programs

A sophisticated understanding of the DOJ Pilot Program requires situating it within the broader ecosystem of federal whistleblower incentive programs, because the choice of where to submit information is a consequential strategic decision.

The SEC Whistleblower Program, established under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, applies to violations of the federal securities laws. It has become one of the government’s most successful law enforcement tools: since its inception in 2011, the SEC has awarded more than $1.9 billion to nearly 400 individual whistleblowers. Awards under the SEC program are mandatory rather than discretionary, ranging from 10% to 30% of sanctions collected in cases exceeding $1 million. The SEC program also provides robust statutory anti-retaliation protections and allows for anonymous submission through counsel.

The CFTC Whistleblower Program operates on a similar framework for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, covering matters such as manipulation of commodity prices and fraud in derivatives markets. Since its launch in 2010, the CFTC has issued over $350 million in whistleblower awards. Like the SEC program, CFTC awards are mandatory within the prescribed range and are accompanied by statutory anti-retaliation rights.

The IRS Whistleblower Program targets tax fraud. It has generated remarkable recoveries—since 2007, the IRS has paid approximately $1.2 billion in awards based on the collection of over $6.9 billion in additional taxes, interest, and penalties from non-compliant taxpayers.

The False Claims Act qui tam mechanism allows private citizens to file sealed lawsuits on behalf of the federal government for fraud against government programs, with relators typically eligible to receive between 15% and 30% of the government’s recovery. The False Claims Act is particularly powerful in the healthcare and defense contracting contexts, where federal dollars are at stake. However, it does not reach fraud against purely private entities.

The DOJ Pilot Program is explicitly designed to complement rather than duplicate these existing programs. An individual who is eligible for an award under the SEC or CFTC program for the same scheme cannot receive a DOJ award for the same information. In practice, this means that prospective whistleblowers with information that potentially implicates multiple programs—for example, a financial fraud that involves both securities violations and money laundering at a financial institution—need to carefully evaluate which program or combination of programs offers the best legal and financial outcome. An experienced whistleblower attorney can be invaluable in navigating these overlapping frameworks.

IX. Implications for Corporations and Compliance Programs

Although this overview is primarily addressed to individuals who may wish to come forward as whistleblowers, it is worth noting the significant implications the Pilot Program has for corporations and their compliance functions. The existence of a well-publicized DOJ whistleblower program creates a powerful incentive for corporate insiders—employees, contractors, vendors, and others—to report potential misconduct directly to the government rather than, or in addition to, using internal reporting channels.

This dynamic has a number of important consequences. First, it raises the stakes for corporations to maintain genuinely effective internal compliance programs and to take internal complaints seriously. An employee who believes that an internal report will be suppressed or ignored is far more likely to go directly to DOJ. Second, it underscores the importance of the DOJ’s Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. Under that policy, a company that proactively discloses misconduct to DOJ before it becomes the subject of a whistleblower tip is in a substantially better position to negotiate a favorable resolution—potentially avoiding an indictment and receiving a reduced fine. Once a whistleblower has already contacted DOJ, the company has lost the benefit of being the first mover.

Third, the expanded scope of the 2025 guidance means that a wider range of corporate conduct is now within the Program’s ambit. Companies in industries newly covered by the expansion—including logistics, international trade, immigration-sensitive sectors, and those with exposure to sanctions regimes—should review and update their compliance programs accordingly.

X. Practical Considerations for Prospective Whistleblowers

For individuals who believe they have information that may qualify under the Pilot Program, the decision to come forward is not one to be taken lightly. It involves legal, financial, professional, and personal considerations that require careful analysis before any action is taken.

From a legal standpoint, the most important preliminary step is to assess personal exposure. If the whistleblower had any involvement in the conduct they are reporting—even a peripheral role—they need to understand whether and how their own conduct could be viewed as criminal, and whether coming forward might prompt DOJ to scrutinize their actions as well. The Program’s requirement that the whistleblower provide complete information, including about their own participation, means there is no safe harbor for selective disclosure.

From a practical standpoint, potential whistleblowers should preserve all relevant evidence in a lawful manner before making any contact with DOJ. Documents, emails, financial records, and communications that support the allegations should be identified and, where appropriate, retained. However, potential whistleblowers should be careful not to remove, copy, or disclose materials in ways that could violate employment agreements, confidentiality obligations, or applicable law—actions that might themselves become the basis of legal claims by the employer or create complications in the investigation.

Timing matters. The Program places value on the timeliness of information—a submission that arrives after DOJ has already opened an investigation, or after the media has reported on the misconduct, may receive less favorable treatment even if the underlying information is otherwise credible and original. That said, rushing to submit without proper legal preparation is inadvisable; a poorly structured or incomplete submission may do more harm than good.

The question of whether to retain counsel before submitting cannot be overstated. Beyond the strategic and legal considerations already discussed, having an attorney submit on the whistleblower’s behalf is the only mechanism through which anonymous submission is available. Given the significant personal and professional risks that whistleblowers frequently face, the ability to proceed anonymously—at least in the initial stages of an investigation—can be extremely valuable.

XI. Looking Ahead

The DOJ’s Pilot Program is exactly that: a pilot. It is a three-year initiative, launched August 1, 2024, meaning it is currently scheduled to run through at least August 2027. Over that period, DOJ will presumably evaluate the volume and quality of submissions, the impact on corporate enforcement outcomes, and whether the Program’s design effectively incentivizes meritorious disclosures. Whether the Program becomes a permanent feature of the DOJ’s enforcement architecture will depend in part on those results, as well as on evolving enforcement priorities and any legislative action that might formalize or expand the program’s statutory authority.

The May 2025 expansion of the Program’s covered categories signals that, regardless of its pilot status, the current administration views the Program as a meaningful enforcement tool and is willing to adapt it quickly to serve broader policy objectives. That adaptability cuts both ways: the Program’s scope may continue to expand, but its priorities and requirements may also shift in ways that affect pending and future submissions.

For individuals considering whether to come forward under the Program, the evolving nature of its guidance is an additional reason to seek legal advice promptly. The rules applicable to a submission made today may differ from those that govern a submission made six months from now, and experienced whistleblower counsel can help navigate both the current requirements and any future changes.

XII. Conclusion

The DOJ Criminal Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program represents one of the most significant developments in federal enforcement in recent years. By creating a direct financial incentive for corporate insiders to report serious criminal misconduct to the nation’s primary law enforcement agency, and by deliberately targeting categories of wrongdoing that existing programs could not reach, the Program has the potential to reshape both the volume and the nature of corporate criminal referrals that DOJ receives.

For individuals who possess credible and original information about covered misconduct, the Program offers a meaningful opportunity to contribute to the public interest while potentially receiving a substantial financial award. However, the path from having information to receiving an award is complex, and the personal legal risks of getting it wrong are significant. The Program’s discretionary award structure, its eligibility exclusions, its rules on culpability, and its interaction with other federal and state whistleblower frameworks all require careful legal analysis before any submission is made.

Our firm has extensive experience advising clients in connection with federal whistleblower programs across multiple agencies. If you believe you have information that may qualify under the DOJ Pilot Program—or under any other federal or state whistleblower framework—we encourage you to contact us for a confidential consultation. We can help you understand your rights, assess your exposure, evaluate the strength of your potential submission, and determine the best course of action to protect both your interests and the integrity of any information you bring forward.

This article is intended for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with a qualified attorney regarding your specific circumstances.

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