April 2026

I. Introduction

On February 10, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order directing the Department of Justice to pause the initiation of new Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigations and prosecutions for a period of 180 days. The order instructed the Attorney General to review existing DOJ guidelines and enforcement priorities, with a stated aim of ensuring that the FCPA was not being applied in a manner that placed American companies at a competitive disadvantage. For many U.S. businesses with international operations, the announcement raised an immediate question: does this mean that anti-bribery compliance is now a lower priority?

The short answer is no. While the executive order represented a meaningful shift in the federal government’s immediate enforcement posture, companies that conclude FCPA exposure is no longer a live concern do so at considerable peril. A number of overlapping enforcement realities have emerged in the months following the announcement, each independently capable of producing criminal prosecution, civil penalties, reputational harm, and exclusion from public contracting.

II. The February 10, 2025 Executive Order: What It Did and Did Not Do

The executive order directed the Attorney General to pause new FCPA enforcement actions for 180 days and to issue updated guidelines governing how the statute would be enforced going forward. However, the order’s legal reach was narrower than its political optics suggested. The FCPA itself was not repealed, suspended, or amended. It remains federal law, enforceable by the DOJ and, with respect to its civil provisions, by the SEC. The executive order created a temporary administrative pause in the opening of new matters; it did not extinguish ongoing investigations, toll statutes of limitations, or immunize conduct occurring before or after its signing.

The pause applied only to the DOJ’s own enforcement activity. The SEC’s parallel civil enforcement authority under the FCPA’s accounting and internal controls provisions was not directly addressed. For publicly traded companies, the civil risk from the SEC therefore continued unabated. The order also did nothing to address foreign enforcement risk—regulators in France, Germany, Brazil, and the United Kingdom, among others, have demonstrated both the willingness and capacity to pursue corruption cases with significant U.S. business dimensions.

III. The DOJ’s Continued Engagement: FCPA Remains “In the Mix”

Former Acting Assistant Attorney General Matthew Galeotti publicly acknowledged that the FCPA remains “in the mix” when it comes to the department’s enforcement toolkit. The DOJ’s Fraud Section—which houses the dedicated FCPA unit—has not disbanded or redeployed its resources away from foreign bribery matters. The enforcement pause was targeted at voluntary disclosure cases and new investigations, not at matters already in the pipeline. For companies already under investigation, or aware they were subjects of existing grand jury investigations or SEC inquiries, the executive order provided no shelter.

Galeotti’s “in the mix” formulation suggests that the DOJ views FCPA enforcement not as something to be abandoned, but as something to be recalibrated—applied more selectively, with greater emphasis on individual accountability and cases with clear national security or competitive harm dimensions. Companies that interpret the executive order as an invitation to relax their compliance programs are misreading both the letter of what the order says and the department’s stated intentions.

IV. California Moves to Fill the Gap: State-Level Anti-Bribery Enforcement

One of the most consequential developments in the post-February 10 landscape has been California’s announced intention to pursue anti-bribery violations under state law. California’s commercial bribery statutes, false claims provisions, and unfair competition law provide overlapping bases for pursuing bribery-related conduct, particularly where the misconduct affects California-based businesses, employees, or public interests. California has jurisdiction over companies incorporated in the state, headquartered there, or undertaking significant business operations there—a universe that includes a substantial proportion of Fortune 500 companies and virtually the entire U.S. technology sector.

California’s statutes of limitations and evidentiary standards differ from federal law, meaning that conduct difficult to prosecute federally may remain actionable under state law. State prosecutors are not bound by the DOJ’s enforcement guidelines or the priorities of the current administration. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine means that a company or individual that avoids federal liability does not thereby acquire immunity at the state level. Other states with significant economic heft—New York and Texas among them—may follow suit, potentially creating a patchwork of state-level anti-bribery regimes with different elements, penalties, and enforcement philosophies.

V. The FCPA Reinforcement Act: Congressional Response to the Enforcement Pause

On March 9, 2026, Congress introduced the FCPA Reinforcement Act, legislation that directly responds to the enforcement environment created by the February 10 executive order. The Act reflects a bipartisan congressional judgment that robust FCPA enforcement serves important national interests—not just anti-corruption principles, but also the competitive interests of law-abiding American companies. Proponents argue that a retreat from FCPA enforcement signals to corrupt actors that the legal risk of bribery has diminished, ultimately rewarding competitors most willing to engage in it.

The Act, as introduced, includes provisions that would reinforce the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement mandate and limit the executive branch’s authority to impose administrative pauses on prosecution of the statute’s provisions. If enacted, it would represent a significant legislative pushback against the use of executive orders to effectively suspend enforcement of criminal statutes.

The mere existence of the legislation puts companies on notice that political winds are not uniformly behind the enforcement pause, and that a future administration—or even the current one in a different political context—could reinstate or intensify FCPA enforcement at any time. Compliance programs wound down or defunded during the pause would require costly and time-consuming reconstruction. The debate surrounding the bill will also likely generate enhanced public and journalistic scrutiny of companies’ past FCPA conduct.

VI. Other Enforcement Vectors That Remain Fully Active

The SEC’s civil enforcement authority under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, books-and-records requirements, and internal controls provisions remains fully operative. SEC investigations are frequently triggered by whistleblower complaints, and the SEC’s whistleblower reward program—paying eligible whistleblowers between 10 and 30 percent of sanctions exceeding $1 million—creates powerful financial incentives for employees, contractors, and competitors to report potential violations regardless of the current federal criminal enforcement posture.

Qui tam actions under the False Claims Act represent another vector of exposure where foreign bribery involves conduct implicating U.S. government procurement—for example, bribing a foreign official to secure a contract partly funded by U.S. foreign assistance dollars. Foreign enforcement through the UK Serious Fraud Office, France’s Parquet National Financier, Brazil’s Ministerio Publico Federal, and multilateral OECD Anti-Bribery Convention obligations means that a U.S. company cannot find safety in reduced federal enforcement posture if the conduct is also being investigated by a foreign counterpart.

VII. Practical Implications for Business Clients

  • Resist the temptation to read the executive order as license to relax anti-corruption compliance programs. The cost of maintaining an effective compliance program is modest compared to the cost of defending an enforcement action. Companies that scale back compliance in reliance on an enforcement pause may be precisely the least prepared when enforcement resumes.
  • Evaluate whether compliance programs are designed to satisfy not just the FCPA but also emerging state-law frameworks and key foreign jurisdiction requirements. A thorough gap analysis conducted with qualified outside counsel is a prudent investment.
  • Companies that have not previously conducted a voluntary self-disclosure analysis should do so now. The DOJ’s voluntary disclosure policies continue to offer material benefits in terms of reduced penalties and cooperation credit.
  • Monitor the legislative progress of the FCPA Reinforcement Act carefully. The Act’s passage, amendment, or failure will each have distinct implications for the enforcement landscape.

VIII. Conclusion

President Trump’s February 10, 2025 executive order was a significant moment in the history of FCPA enforcement, but it was not the end of that history. The DOJ’s own senior officials have made clear that the FCPA remains a live enforcement tool. California has moved to exercise its independent authority under state law. Congress has introduced the FCPA Reinforcement Act. The SEC, foreign regulators, and qui tam relators have never paused. The overall picture is one of continued, multidimensional risk—reshaped and redistributed by the executive order, but not extinguished.

This article is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult qualified counsel regarding their specific circumstances.